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I. INTRODUCTION
The indigenous peoples of the United States are
enmeshed in a complex and unique web of socio-eco-
nomic and jural-political relations.They are, collectively,
an "ethnic" group or class known as American Indians
recognized in American law. This generic categorization,
however, is less conspicuous than the distinct tribal iden-
tities of indigenous peoples. Unlike other ethnic
*Eric Henderson teaches anthropology and criminal jus-
tice at Great Basin College (Elko, Nevado). He holds Ph.D.
(anthropology) and J. D. degrees, both from the University of
Arizona, and clerked for Justice Stanley Feldman of the Arizona
Supreme Court and Judge Joseph Livermore of the Arizona
Court of Appeals. I would like to thank Dr. Thomas Hill for his
comments on an earlier draft of this paper and Elizabeth Garcia
for her dedicated and patient editing.
ISaint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613
(1987) (the Court held that the legislative history of 42 U.S.C.
f 1981 indicated that "Congress intended to protect from dis-
crimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected
to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or
ethnic characteristics").
2Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). (holding that
statute to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power
"groups," recognized Indian tribes maintain a distinct
political relationship with the federal government.
Certain tribal entities however, are not recognized at all.'
The tribal entities that are recognized by the federal gov-
ernment are governed, at least in part, by numerous spe-
cific federal statutes and rules.
To some degree an individual's "ethnic identity"
involves attributes of both self-identification and ascrip-4
tion by others. Historically, one's ancestry or race has
by persons under pretext of authority from the Cherokee
Indians, and providing for imprisonment of persons who
should reside among such Indians within the Cherokee Nation
without first obtaining authority to do so from the governor of
the state, is a nullity, because the Cherokee Nation within the
state of Georgia, having been recognized by the laws and
treaties of the United States as subject to the control and
dominion of the Cherokee Nation of Indians, is not within the
territorial jurisdiction of Georgia).
3American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report,
vol. I 461-84 (1977); See generally, Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and
Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a
Relationship? 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1461, 1472-76 (1991).
Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 610 n.4 ("some, but not
all, scientists ... conclude that racial classifications are for the
most part socio-political").
had a central role in the American social norms of ethnic
ascription.! In addition, other factors such as community
of residence, appearance, language, religion, and culture
may also be important. For an American Indian the
social norms of the wider society are interwoven with
specific tribal norms and laws governing affiliation with
the tribal polity. This is apparent because "[elach tribe,
recognized as a distinct political community, has the
7
power to determine its own tribal membership.
Theoretically, one may become a member of a tribe
without having any tribal or even Indian ancestry as the
Cherokee intermarriage and freedmen cases show .
Conversely, all of one's ancestors may have been tribal
members and yet one may not qualify for tribal mem-
bership. 9 In most situations, individuals fail between
these theoretical poles. Many individuals have several
ancestors who were members of a particular tribe, while
other ancestors were members of a different tribe or
were non-Indian. These individuals may self-identify
5Eric Wolf, Europe and The People Without History, 380-
381 (1982), (distinguishes between racial and ethnic distinc-
tions. He views the former as imposed as a result of the subju-
gation of populations in the course of European mercantile
expansion. Ethnic categories, on the other hand, express the
ways particular populations come to relate themselves to given
segments of the labor market in capitalist systems.) See also,
Carol Mukhopadhyay and Yolanda Moses, Reestablishing Race
in Anthropological Discourse, American Anthropologist
99:517-533 (1997); But see, S.O.Y Keita and Rick Kitties, The
Persistence of Racial Thinking and the Myth of Racial
Divergence, American Anthropologist 99:534-44 (1997).
Pauline Strong and Barrik Van Winkle, Indian Blood:
Reflections on the Reckoning and Refiguring of Native North
American Identity, Cultural Anthropology 11:547-576, (1996)
(discussing contemporary Washoe identity); See also, Joane
Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics and the
Resurgence of Identity, American Sociological Review 60:947-
965 (1995).
Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 248
(1982) [hereinafter Cohen]; citing Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (discussed, infra, part IIA); See
also the Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906) (dis-
cussed, infra, at part IV-A); But see Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218
(1897). The Supreme Court noted in Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 553 (1974), that "employment preferences as applied,
is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but rather as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and
activities are governed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in a
unique fashion.The preference is reasonably and directly relat-
ed to a legitimate, nonracially based goal."
$See discussion, infra part IV A.
9See discussion of Herreras at Zia, infra part IV B and
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 117 S.Ct. 610
(1996); discussed infra part III B.
themselves as Indians or view themselves as members of
a specific tribe,t° but whether they are members of a par-
ticular federally recognized tribe is a separate question.
Thus, individual self-identification as an Indian may not
suffice to qualify as an Indian, at least for tribal purposes
12despite meeting federal criteria for "Indian-ness" under
13one or more statutes.
Historically there has been a sort of semi-permeable
barrier through which some individuals' identities shift
among the categories of tribal member, 4 "Indian" and
non-Indian.The shifts may occur and reoccur throughout
the lives of some individuals and depend upon specific
situational contexts." Perhaps most individuals retain a
specified and seemingly unalterable identity throughout
life, but the number of individuals whose status entails
ambiguity is substantial. 
6
Racial ascription, of course, has long been an impor-
tant element in American social relations. 17 On occasion,
the concept of race has intruded into American legal
l0The United States census currently relies on self-identifi-
cation in enumerating the Indian population and tribal affilia-
tion. C. Matthew Snipp, American Indians: The First of This
Land, at 36-37 (1989).11This was asserted by the Supreme Court in Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n. 24, (limiting the employment pref-
erence to members of recognized tribes operates to exclude
many individuals who are racially to be classified as Indians).
"The basic concept of retaining tribal relations,... con-
tinues to be manifested in the notion that an essential element
of Indian status is a relationship with an Indian tribe." Cohen,
supra note 7 at 23. Cohen notes that Congress has occasional-
ly specified the scheme of tribal membership or delegated that
authority to the Secretary. Id. at 248.
13Cohen, supra note 7, at 23. (There is no single statute that
defines Indian for all federal purposes).
" This may include meeting the criteria of membership in
more than one tribe.15On ethnic boundaries generally, See Frederik Barth,
Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, (1969); See also Nagel, supra
note 6, at 948-51, (discussing the process among American
Indians). But see William Unrau, Mixed-Bloods and Tribal
Dissolution: Charles Curtis and The Quest For Indian
Identity, (1989) (biography of Vice-President Curtis provides a
case study of one person's shifting identity).
16Nagel, supra note 6 at 950-53, notes that the 1960 Census
Bureau decision to rely on self-identification led to increases in
the Indian population that cannot be accounted for by natural
increase. She describes these new Indians as frequently inter-
married, English-speaking urban residents of states with histor-
ically small Indian populations. Snipp, supra note 10 at 57,
believes many of these people formerly passed unrecognized
into white society.
'7Mukhopadhyay and Moses, supra note 5.
decisions regarding tribal membership. 8 Tribal member-
ship criteria usually includes some showing of tribal
ancestry and nearly all tribes specify some "quantity" of
tribal or Indian heritage, usually designated as a thresh-
old blood quantum. Despite the criteria utilized to
determine tribal membership, a blood quantum thresh-
old, most tribes incorporate notions of race into mem-
bership requirements. The connotations of blood quan-
tum are myriad and problematic. ° Individuals who may
be full blood Indians may not meet tribal membership
criteria for other reasons. On the other hand, individu-
als who have only a single remote tribal ancestor and
who have never participated in tribal culture may be
enrolled as a tribal member.
For reasons embedded in the history of relations
between indigenous Americans and non-Indian popula-22
tions, intermarriage has been extensive. As a result,
many people of mixed Indian and non-Indian ancestry
have ethnic identity options.This is part of the social and
political milieu into which Indian gaming was intro-
duced.
"See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432,441 (1926)
(holding that "Pueblo are Indians in race"); United States v.
Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846) (intermarried white person
considered a citizen of the Cherokee Nation under Cherokee
law, remains subject to federal criminal jurisdiction under the
Trade and Intercourse Act because the statute does not speak
of members of a tribe but of the race generally); But see Nofire
v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1896) (which without reference
to Rogers, seems antithetical to it). In Nofire, full-blooded
Cherokee Indians were convicted in federal court for killing
Fred Rutherford. Rutherford, "although a white man . . . had
been adopted into the Cherokee Nation."The Supreme Court
reversed the convictions because jurisdiction over the offence
was "vested in the courts of that [the Cherokee] Nation." Id. at
662.
Snipp, supra note 10 at 362-65 provides an incomplete
list of federally recognized tribes and their blood quantum
requirements for membership.There may be some errors in the
listing (e.g., the Ute: Untahi [sic] Ouray are reported as requir-
ing 1/16 as the threshold blood quantum, but see discussion of
Chapoose in part IV C, infra). Only 18 of the 163 tribes require
more than 1/4 blood and 33 tribes require less.Thus, over two-
thirds (69%) of this sample set the same ancestry threshold
common to a number of federal entitlements. Id. at 34.20Id. at 32-35; See Strong and Van Winkle, supra note 6.
21Such a situation can be illustrated by considering the
operation of the unilineal descent rule, such as that present in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), discussed,
infra, part IIA. For example, using the patrilineal rule imple-
mented in Santa Clara, if a woman from a polity were to marry
a man from a polity following a matrilineal rule such as some
Iroquois tribes, then the children would be considered a full
Indian in ancestry but would not be eligible for enrollment in
either tribe. By contrast, if the Santa Clara woman's brother
Indian gaming has also been incorporated into a
legal domain, federal Indian law, which lacks coherency.
Some of the fundamental premises of federal Indian law
are contradictory. Many judicial decisions stress the ele-
ments of sovereignty that inhere to the tribal polity. At
times, there has been some deference to tribal sover-
eignty generally. On the other hand, numerous other
decisions bow to the plenary power of Congress to set
Indian policy. Congress has sought to dissolve tribal poli-
ties and to submerge individual tribal members in the
wider American political economy. Federal policy has
also treated various legal domains differently regardless
of general trends in policy. In some domains tribal sover-
eignty has been severely delineated, while in others
23 pol-
icy has placed fewer restrictions on tribal autonomy.
Criminal jurisdiction is an example of a legal domain
in which restrictive views of sovereignty has prevailed.
4
Federal courts have continued to take a restrictive view
of sovereignty in matters of criminal jurisdiction.'5 When
the federal courts have recognized a relatively wider
sphere of tribal jurisdiction, as in Ex Parte Crow Dog,26
married the Iroquois man's sister, the children of that couple
would be eligible for enrollment in either tribe .Thus, some peo-
ple with identical grandparents could be tribal members while
others would not qualify.
"John Moore and Janis Campbell, Blood Quantum and
Ethnic Intermarriage in the Boas Data Set, Human Biology
67(3):499-516 (1995); AJ. Jaffe, The First Immigrants From
Asia:A Population History of The Indians of North America,
169-178 (1992). Indians marry members of other groups (espe-
cially whites) far more frequently than do members other
minority groups. Snipp, supra note 10 at 156-61; Nagel, supra
note 6 at 952-53.
23See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
See infra, part I-A.
24
Evidence of this restrictive approach can be found in the
earliest treaties and Congressional acts.The first treaty between
the United States and an Indian Nation, the 1778 Treaty with
the Delaware Indians provided that offenses committed by cit-
izens of one nation against those of any other would be tried
by judges or juries of both parties. Congress, however asserted
criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and inhabitants who
committed crimes against Indians in Indian territory by the
terms of the first Trade and Intercourse Act. 1 Stat. 137, chapter
XXXIII, section 5 (1790).
25See US. v. Rogers, 44 U.S. 567 (1846); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Duro v. Reina
495 U.S. 676 (1990).
26109 U.S. 556 (1883). Crow Dog, a Sioux Indian, killed
Spotted Tail, also a Sioux. The Court held that the Sioux had
retained exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes in which
both the victim and the defendant were tribal members
because no treaty or act of Congress had limited Sioux sover-
eignty in this domain.
Congress has often responded by narrowing the scope
27
of tribal power.
This paper explores some implications of a recently
enacted expression of federal policy, the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act ("IGRA"),78 for the relationship between
tribal polities and their constituent members. When a
federal policy is designed to diminish the sphere of trib-
al sovereignty and to confer a purported economic ben-
efit on a tribe or its members, federal scrutiny of tribal
membership criteria is heightened. With this greater
scrutiny, federal intervention into this crucial arena of
tribal sovereignty is more likely.As Indians challenge trib-
al actions related to IGRA, some courts have avoided the
clear import of the Martinez decision. 29 Rather, many
courts seek threads in the law to connect an individual's
right to benefit from tribal assets with the collective• 30
rights of the tribal sovereign to determine membership
in the tribal polity. Such decisions reflect the difficulties
of a "liberal" American jurisprudence in weighing both
individual and collective rights.3 2 These decisions also
reflect an enduring controversy concerning the estab-
lishment of Indian self-identity in the United States.33
Such decisions, read by an unsympathetic Congress,
potentially predict new incursions into the domain of
tribal sovereignty and to a certain extent tribal member-
ship criteria, which has historically been given strong
protection.
There are connections among a number of factors
influencing Congress to enter the domain of tribal mem-
bership rules. These factors include: popular34 views of
Indian identity that may reflect notions of the republican
27Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153 in
1885 to limit the holding in Ex Parte Crow Dog. Cohen, supra
note 7, at 300. Even though Congress expanded tribal jurisdic-
tion to a degree in the wake of Duro, it did not fully recognize
tribal authority over all persons within the territory of the trib-
al polity. Rather, it crafted a limited, seemingly racially based,
expansion of tribal jurisdiction to Indians who were not mem-
bers of the tribal polity. See generally, Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It.A Power
Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 767
(1993).
225 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21. (1988).
29These cases include Maxam and Ross, discussed infra at
21-24 n. 104-125. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49,72 (1978) held that tribal membership determinations were
generally an area of tribal discretion because the "right to
define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been
recognized as central to its existence as an independent politi-
cal community."
30Discussions of the relationship of individual and collec-
tive rights can be found in Lawrence Rosen, The Right to Be
Different: Indigenous Peoples and the Quest for a Unified
Theory, 107 Yale L.J. 227 (1997) and Richard Thompson, Ethnic
Minorities and the Case for Collective Rights, 99 American
Anthropologist 786 (1997).
35Congress; individuals' self-identification as tribal mem-
bers; the nature and extent of the economic benefit
accruing to the tribe; how benefits are enjoyed by mem-
bers of the tribal polity; the history of each tribes rela-
tionship with the federal government; and the surround-
ing non-Indian population.
Part II of this paper provides an overview of the
IGRA and briefly discusses the way in which enactment
of the IGRA may subvert sovereignty. Part III focuses on
several recent disputes concerning tribal membership
which invoke IGRA as well as a few other membership
disputes with no apparent connection to IGRA. Part IV
presents case studies of three earlier tribal membership
controversies. These cases illustrate the nexus of tribal
membership and identity, economic benefits, and federal
policy. The cases allow for a comparative and historical
understanding of contemporary, IGRA related member-
ship controversies.
II. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT, TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)6 was
enacted by Congress in 1988 following more than a
decade of controversy between tribes and states over the
ability of states to constrain on-reservation economic
enterprises. Congress, finding federal policy was to pro-
mote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficien-37
cy, and strong tribal government, passed the Act
expressly to provide a statutory basis for achieving these38
goals through regulated gaming activities.
3
1Liberal is used here in a broad sense as a political philos-
ophy espoused by such theorists as Locke,J. S. Mill, and Rawls.
See Rosen, supra note 30 at 233. See also Louis Hartz, The
Liberal Tradition InAmerica (1955).Thompson,supra note 30
at 787 asserts that Liberals are fundamentally concerned with
individual and not group rights.
32Thompson, supra note 31 at 788, argues that collective
rights neither trump, supplant or justify abuses of individual
rights. They are rights in addition to individual rights that
speak to certain group relationships (original emphasis).
33Rosen, supra note 30 at 229-231 discusses, with special
reference to American Indians, the ambivalence that citizens of
many nations feel toward the indigenous people living within
their borders.34See generally Robert Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian
Images of the American Indian From Columbus to the
Present (1978); Rayna Green, The Indian in PopularAmerican
Culture, IN Handbook of the North American Indians, Vol. 4:
History of Indian-White Relations (587-606) (1988).3 .Republican is used here in Madison's sense in Federalist
Paper #10. Clinton Rossiter (ed.),The Federalist Papers (1961).
625 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1988).
3725 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (1988).
M25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988).
A Background on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
In the 1970s, some tribes sought to generate revenue
through the sale of tobacco products. All on-reservation
tobacco sales were exempt from state taxation.39 As a
result, tribal smoke-shops held a competitive advantage
over nonIndian sellers.40 The United States Supreme
Court curtailed the benefits from this revenue source
when it ruled that Indians had no right to the "artificial"
advantage of the jurisdictional tax differential."'
Following this set-back, several tribes began to promote
high stakes bingo as a modern revenue source.
Jurisdictional disputes with surrounding states devel-
oped with regard to the regulation of this new econom-
ic enterprise. One such dispute involved California's
attempt to hinder tribal bingo operations within its bor-
ders.
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians,3 the Supreme Court held that state regulation
of a tribe's bingo business would impermissibly infringe
44
upon tribal government. Because California had adopt-
ed a public policy that did not prohibit gambling gener-
ally,4 the Cabazon court further held that the state could
not repulate gaming that was taking place on reservation
lands. The court opined that the economic develop-
ment represented by the gaming enterprise was an inte-




41Confederated Colville Tribes, 447 U.S. at 151 (holding
that the state could collect taxes from nonIndian cigarette pur-
chasers on reservations because the burden on the reservation
merchant in collecting the tax was "minimal."); See Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483
(1976). See also Cohen, supra note 7 at 41316.
42
In 1979, the Seminole's began using bingo to generate
revenue.The New York Oneida Tribe began its bingo operation
at about the same time. Amendments to the Indian Gaming
RegulatoryAct: Hearings on S. 2230 Before the Select Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 260 (1994). See generally Eduardo E.
Cordeiro, The Economics of Bingo: Factors Influencing the
Success of Bingo Operations on American Indian
Reservations, in What Can Tribes Do,? Strategies and
Institutions in American Indian Economic Development 205-11
(1992). The New York Oneida Tribe began its bingo operation
at about the same time. Amendments to the Indian Gaming
RegulatoryAct: Hearings on S. 2230 Before the Select Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 260 (1994).
43480 U.S. 202 (1987).
4Id. at 222.
45California encouraged gambling in several forms. Id. at
gral component of tribal self-determination."
Many state governments expressed concern over the
outcome of the Cabazon case. Although legislation was
considered by Congress prior to the Cabazon decision, 49
the outcome hastened the enactment of the IGRA with-
in a year. Congress echoed the Cabazon Court's view
that gaming was "a means of promoting tribal economic
development which was necessary to strengthen tribal
governments." Notwithstanding the policy objectives
of IGRA, Congress also crafted provisions that restricted
the sphere of tribal sovereignty in pursuing those goals."
The statutory scheme of the IGRA creates three
classes of gaming and apportions jurisdiction over the
classes among different entities. Class I aming is within
the Indian tribes' exclusive jurisdiction' and consists of
social games for prizes of minimal value. Traditional
forms of Indian gaming such as tribal ceremonies or cel-
ebrations are also classified as Class I.13 Class II gamin
consists of bingo and certain types of card games.
Jurisdiction over Class H gaming is primarily tribal," but
must comply with IGRA's mandates and receive approval
from the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)."
The NIGC is funded, in part, through fees imposed on• . • 57
each class II gaming activity. The NIGC consists of a58
three members and has authority to approve tribal gain-
596




'See Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival. The
Consent Principle and TribalState Compacts Under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 25,47 (1997).
"Alex Tallchief Skibine, Gaming on Indian Reservations:
Defining the Trustee's Duty in the Wake of Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 29 Ariz. St. L. J. 121, 129 (1997). See also US Code
Congressional and Administrative News, 100th Congress, 2d
Session, vol. 5 at 3073-74 (1988) (Senate Report No. 100-446).
5025 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988).
51See infra, part II-B. See also, Stephen Cornell & Joseph P
Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for
Economic Development onAmerican Indian Reservations, in
What Can Tribes Do,? (1992) (stressing the importance of trib-
al sovereignty as a prerequisite for successful economic devel-
opment).
5225 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (1988).
5325 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1988).
5425 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (1988).
525 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2) (1988).
5625 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b), (c) 2704-2706,2711-2716 (1988).
5725 U.S.C. § 2717 (1988).
5825 U.S.C. § 2704(b) (1988).
5925 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)-(c), 1712(b) (1988).
6025 U.S.C. §§ 2711, 1712(c) (1988).
61
and investigate gaming practices, and to levy fines for61 63
violations of the Act. Class III gaming is a residual cat-
egory which includes all forms of gaming falling outside
of Class I or Class H gaming, and is usually equated with
casino gaming. Class III gaming involves regulation, pur-
suant to a compact, by both the tribe and the state with-
in which the tribe is located.6 The Secretary of the
Interior has the authority to approve or, under certain
conditions, reject the compact. The Act also contains a
severability clause.66
Indian gaming has expanded enormously since the
passage of IGRA. In 1987 there were 108 gaming facili-
6125 U.S.C. §§ 2706,2715 (1988).
225 U.S.C. §§ 2706(a), 2713 (1988).
6325 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1988).
625 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (1988).
6525 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(8) (1988).
6625 U.S.C. § 2721 (1988). See Skibine supra note 49 at 132-
42, for a discussion of the severability issues in the wake of the
holdig in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 114 (1996).
Prepared statement of Ross Swimmer, Assistant Secretary
for Indian Affairs, in Hearing before The Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, House Of Representatives, 100th Congress,
First Session on H.R. 964 (to provide for the regulation of gam-
ing on Indian lands, and for other purposes); H.R. 2507 (to
establish federal standards and regulations for the conduct of
gaming activities on Indian reservations and lands, and for
other purposes).
6The 328 federally recognized tribes are listed in 62 Fed.
Reg. 55270, Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs
(October 23, 1997).The Indian Gaming Management Staff of the
BIA maintains a listing of tribal state compacts at
http://www.doi.gov/bia/foia/compact.htm. As of September 2,
1997 there were 171 compacts listed.The list notes that 24 states
had entered into compacts with 146 tribes. Unambiguous preci-
sion is difficult for several reasons. (1) In some states there is
more than a single compact with a single tribe. For example, in
Minnesota each tribe has one compact for Video games of
chance and a separate compact for blackjack. (2) In some cases,
separate reservations that are components of a single federally
recognized tribe have separate compacts with the state.Thus, the
Barona Group and the Viejas Group, both of the Capitan Grande
Band of Digueno Mission Indians of California, have separate
compacts with the state. Each of the six component reservations
of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe has a separate compact with
Minnesota. (3) Several tribes have entered into compacts with
more than a single state. For example, the Fort MojaveTribe, with
territory in three states, has compacts with both Arizona and
Nevada but not California and two tribes the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux and the Standing Rock Sioux) have compacts with both
South Dakota and North Dakota. (4) Some compacts that have
been approved by the BIA have been challenged and may not be
legally valid.A prime example of this situation is Pueblo of Santa
ties on Indian land that mostly consisted of bingo enter-67
prises. By 1997, however, slightly over 40% of the 328
federally recognized tribes had entered into tribal-state66
compacts to conduct Class III gaming. In many states
every federally recognized tribe has a Class III 
compact.69
In other states there are no compacts. Some states with
numerous federally recognized tribes, notably California,
Nevada and Oklahoma have entered into compacts with
only a few tribes. California's governor and attorney gen-
eral have been particularly hostile to Indian gaming inter-
7'
ests. Several tribes have also rejected gaming proposals
72
in electoral referenda.
Ana v. Kelly, 104 E3d 1546 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 45
(1997) (holding that compacts between the state of New Mexico
and various tribes were invalid because the governor lacked the
authority to sign the compacts).The New Mexico legislature sub-
sequently enacted a statute that conferred authority on the gov-
ernor to enter into compacts but specified certain provisions
that were to be included in such compacts. Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. New Mexico, [1997 U.S.App. Lexis 34495].Various tribes
have since renegotiated compacts with the state. The Secretary
has allowed the compacts to go into effect without his approval
because of concerns over two of the provisions dictated by state
law. See also 62 Fed Reg. 59878 (notice of tribal-state compacts
between New Mexico and the Picuris, Santa Ana, Jicarilla and
Nambe tribes); 62 Fed Reg. 53650 (notice of San Juan - New
Mexico Compact).
6Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota
and Wisconsin are the states with more than two tribes in
which all tribes have entered into tribal-state compacts. There
are two tribes in both Colorado and Connecticut and each of
these tribes has a compact. In Mississippi, North Carolina and
Rhode Island the only recognized tribe within the state has a
compact. Iowa has a compact with the Meskwaki as well as
with two Nebraska tribes, the Omaha and the Winnebago oper-
ating casinos along the Missouri River.
70In six states where there is at least one federally recog-
nized tribe, there are no tribal compacts: Alabama, Florida,
Maine, Texas, Utah and Wyoming. Only two states, Utah and
Hawaii, completely prohibit gambling.Tsosie, supra note 48 at
47 n.125. Hence, none of the five Utah tribes conducts class II
or III gaming. Florida's refusal to negotiate compacts is well
documented. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
The Passamaquoddy were precluded from compelling the state
to enter into Class III compacts by the terms of the Maine
Indian Claims Settlement Act. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Maine, 75 E3d 784 (1st Cir. 1996).
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Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming: Social Consequences,
29 Ariz. St. L.J. 205, 248 (1997). There are about 100 federally
recognized tribes in California, but California has entered into
only five state-tribal compacts. Nearly 60% of tribes outside of
California have tribal-state gaming compacts.
72These include the Navajo, Hopi and Seneca. Henderson,
supra note 71 at 239.
B. Restraints on Tribal Sovereignty Under IGRA
Although IGRA has established a framework that
promotes the statutory goal of "economic development,"
its impact on strengthening tribal government is less
clear. Most tribes initially opposed the passage of IGRA.73
This opposition was based primarily of the "compact"74
provisions which gives states considerable influence
over gaming on Indian lands. 5
While self-determination has been the explicit
theme of federal Indian policy during the last third of the76
twentieth century, a paternalistic limitation on self-
determination is embedded in IGRA's limitations on the
use of Class II gaming revenues. A tribal ordinance that
authorizes Class H gaming must provide that net rev-
enues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for pur-
poses other than to:
(i) fund tribal government operations or programs;
(ii) provide for the general welfare of the Indian
tribe and its members;
(iii) promote tribal economic development;
(iv) donate to charitable organizations; or
(v) help fund operations of local government agen-
cies.
Furthermore, per capita distribution of any of these
revenues can only occur following approval of the plan
by the Secretary of Interior. These provisions grant fed-
eral officials significant influence over the way tribes allo-
cate Class H gaming proceeds and, consequently, allow
federal officials to influence, if not dictate, the terms by
which tribal governments relate to tribal members.
The tripartite classification of gaming and appor-
tionment of jurisdiction also can potentially diminish
tribal sovereignty. State governments, through the Class
III compact process, have a direct impact on the con-
73Skibine, supra note 49 at 129.
74Id.
75Thus, the requirements that Class Ill gaming be autho-
rized under state law and pursuant to a compact erodes tribal
sovereignty. See Skibine, supra note 49 at 12122, 13032 (1997);
See Tsosie, supra note 48.
76Cohen, supra note 7 at 180-188.
725 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (1988).
7825 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3) (1988).
79For example, the location of casino sites may be subject
to negotiation. Wisconsin Winnebago Nation v. Thompson,
824 E Supp 167,171 (W.D.Wis. 1993), aff'd, 22 E3d 719 (7th Cir.
1994).
'Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Hull,
945 P2d 818 (1997).
81436 U.S. 49 (1978).
82Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671, 720-21
(1989). Resnik argues that the availability of federal benefits is
central to understanding why the Martinez family tried to
obtain recognition of its children of members of the Pueblo.
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tours of a tribe's gaming enterprises. Such impacts may
have implications for how a tribe approaches member-
ship issues. In Arizona, for example, the standard form of
gaming compacts authorizes a specified number of gam-
ing facility locations based on the tribe's number of
enrolled members.8° Thus, IGRA provides a state with
influence in a domain historically within the sphere of
tribal sovereignty and protected from state interference.
III. IGRA AND THE LAW OF TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP
The leading case affirming the right of tribes to
determine membership criteria, Santa Clara Pueblo v.
81
Martinez, centered on the importance of tribal sover-
812eignty in vindicating Puebloan cultural values.
Commentators sympathetic to both the collective rights
inherent in tribal sovereignty and liberal values of esual
protection have described the case as the "difficult."
A. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
In 1941 a Santa Clara Pueblo woman, Julia Martinez,
married a Navajo man. The couple lived at Santa Clara
and raised their children within the pueblo.The Martinez
children spokeTewa and participated in Santa Clara life.
Santa Clara law provided that all children of a Santa Clara
father were eligible for membership but that children of
a Santa Clara mother and non-Santa Clara father were not
eligible. Mrs. Martinez and her daughter claimed that the
membership criterion constituted discrimination on the
basis of sex and ancestry in violation of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA)."5 Justice Marshall's opinion
echoed the district court's view that membership rules
were "no more or less than a mechanism of social ... def-
inition, and as such were basic to the tribe's survival as a
Resnik has amply documented this contention with reference
to trial briefs and interviews and provides a partial list of fed-
eral benefits available to members of Indian tribes. It is worth
noting, however, that the Martinez children were also eligible
for enrollment through their father's line in the Navajo Tribe
and thus could have met the tribal member's criterion for fed-
eral benefits without ever qualifying for membership at Santa
Clara Pueblo.
83Both the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Department of Justice entered the case after debating which
side to support. Resnik, supra note 82 at 726-727 n. 260. Resnik
asserts the case tells more about United States' norms than it
does about tribal norms. She further asserts that because fed-
eral norms about the treatment of women were not really
threatened by the Santa Clara Pueblo membership rule, the
case was an "easy" one for the Court to proclaim its commit-
ment to tribal sovereignty. "For those of us who believe in
women's rights and are also concerned about federal govern-
ment imperialism, the case becomes hard."
84436 U.S. at 53 n.5.
8525 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303; 436 U.S. at 51.
cultural and economic entity." The Court held that ICRA
authorized a federal review of tribal decisions only in
habeas corpus proceedings. 87
The terms of the controversy were set several
decades earlier.88 Santa Clara Pueblo passed its ordinance
in 1939 to create an ad hoc, but explicit,per se member-
ship criterion based on patrilineal descent.89 This amend-
ment was a response to a specific situation.At times non-
Indians who have married into a Pueblo have manipulat-
ed village affairs. 90
Thus, the membership rule adopted by the Pueblo,
perhaps overbroad in design, was enacted to preserve
the cultural order. The Martinez case indicates that per
se rules for membership eligibility, such as the patrilineal
descent rule at Santa Clara and the many instances of
"blood quantum" levels used by other tribes, are fre-
quently a proxy for the more fundamental criterion of
adherence to tribal values.
B. Per Capita Distributions of Gaming Revenues
Under IGRA:A Federal and Tribal Court Analysis
It is doubtful that Congress would have specified how
tribes might allocate revenues among its members if Indian
gaming had not been viewed as extremely lucrative. The
Second Circuit has alluded to such a consideration in
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians.9' Poodry
alleged that his loss of tribal membership violated the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 92 The majority saw the case
as significant because it arose"at a time when some Indian
tribal communities have achieved unusual opportunities
for wealth [presumably Class fI gaming], thereby unavoid-
ably creating incentives for dominant elites to 'banish' irk-
some dissidents for'treason.'The Poodry court dismissed
86436 U.S. at 53.
'Id. at 66-67.
W W Hill, An Ethnography Of Santa Clara Pueblo New
Mexico, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, (1982)
190-20, details the political factionalism at Santa Clara in the
1930s. He also noted that between about 1900 and 1940, mar-
riage to non-Puebloans increased and, by the latter date there
were a greater number of non-Tewa spouses who ha[d] taken
up residence in the village. Id. at 156. People at Santa Clara
expressed disapproval of marriages with non-Tewas. Id. at 155.
89436 U.S. at 52
90In the 1870s the Keresan Pueblo of Laguna had incorpo-
rated at least two Anglo-American men who had married
Laguna women. Edward H. Spicer, Cycles of Conquest 177
(1962). One,Walter Marmon, later became Pueblo Governor. Id.
Factionalism at Laguna in the ensuing decades is sometimes
traced to the entry of Marmon and his brother into tribal
affairs. Id. at 177-78. The relative lack of intermarriage at the
Tewa Pueblo of Tesuque has been credited as the most impor-
tant factor promoting village solidarity. John Bodine,
Acculturation Processes and Population Dynamics, In New
perspectives on The Pueblos (Alfonso Ortiz, ed. 270 (1972).
the claim against the tribe but not the tribal officials and
remanded the case for a hearing on the merits.9 4 The major-
ity suggested the ICRA may be" a new law allowing it to
avoid the Supreme Court's holding in Roff v. Burney that
no provision of federal law restricted the power of the
Chickasaw Nation in withdrawing privileges of member-
ship.97 Whatever doubts the majority entertained about
construing the ICRA in this way was assuaged by the
knowledge that, if we are wrong, Congress will have ample
opportunity to correct our mistake.9
1. Federal Cases
The ICRA emphasis on individual rights limits, to
some degree, collective tribal prerogatives. 9 Several
recent challenges to tribal actions related to the distrib-
ution of gaming revenues have been based on ICRA. °°
Federal District Courts were solicitous in fashioning
equitable relief in two early cases brought by tribal mem-
bers challenging tribal government per capita distribu-
tions of gaming revenues. In both Ross v. Flandreau
Santee Sioux Tribe ' and Maxam v. Lower Sioux Indian
Community °2 tribal governments distributed a portion
of gaming revenues as per capita payments to certain
enrolled tribal members but not others.' °3 In both cases
the distributional plans had not been specifically
approved by the Secretary of Interior as required by
1 04Section 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3) of IGRA. The courts
found that enrolled members not receiving per capita
payments met the standards for standing105 and that trib-
al sovereign immunity was waived because "[a]ny tribe
which elects to reap the benefits of gaming authority
created by IGRA must comply with the Acts require-
ments."'8 6 Finally, both courts concluded that, unless the





96Roff, 168 U.S. 218 (1897).
'Id. at 222.
9Id. A less sanguine observer might note that Congress
could exercise its plenary power to incorporate the majority's
"mistake" into federal statute.
9See Rosen supra note 30 and Thompson supra note 30.
100See infra, part III(B)(2).
0. 809 F Supp. 738 (D.S.D. 1992).
829 F Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1993).
.'Ross, 809 ESupp. at 741; Maxam 829 F Supp. at 279.
104 ESupp. Supp.
Ross, 809 ESupp. at 743; Maxam 829 E Supp. at 281.'Ross, 809 ESupp. at 743-44; Maxam 829 E Supp. at 279-81
106Maxam 829 E Supp. at 281; see also Ross, 809 ESupp. at
745 ("Engaging in gaming pursuant to the IGRA constitutes an
express waiver of sovereign immunity on the issue of compli-
ance with the IGRA").
tribe articulated a justification for distinguishing among
enrolled members that was approved by the Secretary, all
enrolled members had a right to share in per capita pay-107
ments under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Ross court
ordered the tribe to cease all per capita payments until a108
per capita plan was approved by the Secretary. In
Maxam the court took control of a portion of tribal
funds designated for per capita distribution."
Subsequent decisions have rejected or limited the
Ross and Maxam holdings concerning the waiver of trib-
al immunity under IGRA. 11 This has been especially true
in cases involving membership disputes.'1 ' The judges in
Ross and Maxam were apparently quite concerned by
what they viewed as an inequitable distribution of gam-112
ing proceeds among tribal members. Both tribes limit-
ed most distributions only to enrolled members residing
on or near tribal lands. 113 Under these formula both tribes
distributed gaming revenues to less than a third of
t07Ross, 809 ESupp. at 746; Maxam 829 E Supp. at 282,284.
108Ross, 809 ESupp. at 747.
'
0Maxam 829 E Supp. at 285.
'0Davids v. Coyhis, 869 E Supp. 1401, 1407-08 (E.D.Wis.
1994) (finding neither [Maxam nor Ross] persuasive because
they are contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)). Calvello v.
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 899 E Supp. 431, 438 (D. C. S.D. 1995)
(finding Ross and Maxam "stand at most for the proposition
that federal courts may find a waiver of tribal sovereign immu-
nity for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the IGRA
where prospective injunctive relief, and not monetary relief, is
sought"); Federico v. Capital Gaming Int'l, Inc., 888 E Supp.
354, 357 (D.R.I. 1995) (the waiver of immunity under IGRA in
Maxam is narrowly limited and does not support a waiver of
sovereign immunity in a breach of contract action related to
lobbying services to secure class HI gaming eligibility). But see
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, [U.S. LEXIS 34495
at*19] (While there is sparse case law on the issue, it appears
the majority supports the view that IGRA waived tribal sover-
eign immunity in the narrow category of cases where compli-
ance with IGRA's provisions is at issue and where only declara-
tory or injunctive relief is sought).
1 Lincoln v. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of
Michigan, 967 E Supp. 966, 967 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Smith v.
Babbitt, 875 E Supp. 1353, 1360 (D. Minn. 1995) (questioning
the Maxam and Ross decisions and finding that to extend their
holdings to a membership dispute was contrary to the explicit
purpose of IGRA), aff'd, 100 E3d 556 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 46 (1997).
12In this sense both cases seem to have been viewed as
implicating 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) of the Indian Civil RightsAct.
3n Ross, the Flandreau Santee Sioux government had
adopted ordinances which distributed payments only to
enrolled members who resided within the tribal community.
Only those enrolled tribal members who lived within the de
facto boundary of the disestablished reservation received per
capita payments. Ross, 809 ESupp. at 741. Similarly, in Maxam,
the tribe distributed gaming revenues only to members that
114
enrolled tribal members.
Both Ross and Maxam involved Santee Sioux tribes.
The Flandreau and Lower Sioux are two of seven recog-
nized Santee tribal entities."' Unlike their Lakota Sioux
congeners to the west, the Santee have little land. In fact,
several communities have only been recently recognized
by the federal government. 6These tribes have a history
of providing incentives for members remaining within
the community.
7
After Ross the Secretary approved the Flandreau
Santee Sioux plan for per capita distributions. Other
individuals denied tribal membership then sought relief
in federal court. "9 In Montgomery v. Flandreau SanteeI
Sioux, the plaintiffs alleged that tribal officials had grant-
ed "membership to others with lesser degrees of Indian
blood."1 The Montgomery court determined that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both IGRA and122
ICRA and dismissed the complaint. Another case
either lived within a ten mile radius of the reservation or who
received approval from a majority of eligible members in a
community referendum. Maxam, 829 E Supp. at 279.
'" The Flandreau Santee Sioux had a total enrollment of
611 members but only 158 lived within the "de facto bound-
ary" Ross, 809 ESupp. at 740-41. Thus, approximately 25% of
tribal members received about $8,000 per year while the non-
resident remainder received nothing. The Lower Sioux Indian
Community made per capita distributions to 141 members,
while at least 300 other members were ineligible. Maxam 829
E Supp. at 279.At most, 32% of enrolled members received per
capita payments. It was alleged that 47 members residing with-
in the area defined by the tribal ordinance did not receive per
capita payments. Id. at 284. These individuals were of special
concern to the court: [p]articularly with regard to enrolled
members residing within the defined boundaries of the reser-
vation, it is not clear that the defendants have a rational basis
for refusing per capita payments. Id.
11562 FR 55270-78
n6For a comprehensive history of the Santee Sioux see Roy
W Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian
Policy on Trial (rev. ed., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1993).
"'Id. at 273-93 (late 19th century re-establishment of
Santee Communities in Minnesota), at 314-315. (Nebraska
Santee opposition to termination), at 337 (mid 20th century
out-migration from Flandreau and Minnesota communities
"largely compensated for by a high birth rate"), at 356-57 (1958
revival of powwow at Prairie Island), and 356 n.42 ("commu-
nity spirit" at Lower Sioux).
Montgomery v. Flandreau Santee Sioux, 905 E Supp.
740,745 (D.S.D. 1995).
""The tribal ordinance waived the sovereign immunity
defense for cases involving persons denied per capita pay-
ments based on failure to meet residency requirements or
other qualifications. Id. The ordinance required that such
actions be brought in tribal court. Id.





involving enrollment in a Santee polity and entitlement
to gaming revenues was decided upon similar grounds.
In Smith v. Babbitt"3 persons who had applications for
membership in the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux
Community denied or delayed brought suit in tribal124
court and federal court. In the federal action the plain-
tiffs alleged that the tribal government and Interior
Department had violated numerous federal laws.
Recognizing the plaintiffs could suffer irreparable harm
through loss of voting rights and per capita payments,12
the district court, nevertheless, dismissed the action
because it was based on determinations of tribal mem-
bership which could only be resolved in tribal court.126
As in Montgomery, the court explicitly noted that the
tribe had "expressly waived sovereign immunity from
suit in tribal court for actions disputing an individual's




The problematic parameters of federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction can be illustrated by three related cases
involving political factionalism and the operation of a
gaming facility by Stockbridge-Munsee Community Band
of Mohican Indians in Wisconsin. Although member-
ship determinations are not directly at issue, these cases
reveal some interesting aspects of jurisdiction that may
be relevant to future membership disputes. The
Stockbridge Tribe is governed by a seven member coun-129
cil that includes the tribal president. The council con-
trols membership of the gaming board and oversees the
operation of the tribe's casino. In early 1994, the coun-
123875 E Supp. 1353, 1360 (D. Minn. 1995), affd, 100 E3d
556 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 46 (1997).
124A brief summary of this controversy is found in
Henderson, supra note 71 at 240-41.
12875 E Supp. at 1369-70.
126Id. at 1361, 1366-67.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal because all the allegations were "merely
attempts to move this dispute, over which this court would not
otherwise have jurisdiction, into federal court." Smith v.
Babbitt, 100 E3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 46 (1997).
"Id. at 559.
'Miller v. Coybis, 877 E Supp. 1262 (E.D. Wis. 1995);
Davids v. Coybis, 869 E Supp. 1401 (E.D.Wis. 1994); Davids v.
Coyhis, 857 E Supp. 641 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
D29Davids, 869 E Supp. at 1402-1403.
"Id. at 1403.
131Miller, 877 E Supp. at 1264. In May, 1994 during a distur-
bance at the tribal headquarters, the tribal police chief attempt-
ed to remove the tribal president, Coyhis, from the premises.
877 E Supp. at 1264-65. The following day the four member
majority of the council succeeded in passing an ordinance that,
inter alia, provided that a tribal employee could be terminated
for failure to comply with an order of the president. Id. at 1265.
The police chief was then terminated, ex post facto. Id. In June,
the council minority managed to seize control of tribal head-
cil was bitterly divided and the four member majority
ignored the three member minority. 3 The council
minority sued the president and other three members of
the council majority alleging violations of IGRA."3 ' The
president and council majority, on behalf of the tribe,
also filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the minority
from interfering with the operation of the tribal govern-
ment and casino. 3 The court granted the tribe's request
because "denial of injunctive relief here would be to
encourage a coup d'etat." The court, classifying the dis-
sident council members' complaint as one seeking a pri-
vate cause of action under IGRA,'33 dismissed the dissi-
dents' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court rea-
soned that an inference "to infer a waiver of tribal sover-
eign immunity would disserve the congressional policy
of promoting strong tribal governments because any fed-
eral remedy would supplant the tribes' ability to deter-
mine "disputes affecting important personal and proper-
ty interests of both Indians and non-Indians."1 3 6
Furthermore, it would oblige the federal courts to enter
the quagmire of political dissension in the Community's
governing body.
In two other recent cases, federal courts have dis-
missed suits regarding tribal enrollment controversies that
have no explicit (or apparent) relationship to gaming.13 In
a third case, Shenandoah v. United States,39 the district
court dismissed an ICRA claim by Oneida plaintiffs whose
tribal membership had been revoked and who had been
"deprived of their voice."The plaintiffs were political dis-
quarters, operation of the casino and control over casino funds.
Davids, 857 E Supp. at 644.The federal district court dismissed
the police chief's wrongful termination suit for lack of juris-
diction because the action "sought adjudication of the merits of
an intratribal dispute. Miller 877 E Supp. at 1268.
132Davids, 869 E Supp. at 1402.
133Davids, 857 E Supp. at 644.
13'Id. at 647.
13'Davids, 869 E Supp. at 1405 n.7, 1409 n.ll, 1412.
'6Santa Clara, 438 U.S. at 65.
"7Davids, at 869 E Supp. at 1411. The cases that emerge
from the Stockbridge factional strife are problematic.The court
characterizes the cases as ones that involve strictly intra-tribal
political questions. Hence, the federal court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.The actions brought by dissidents are consequently
dismissed. Nevertheless, the court asserts jurisdiction in order to
grant the relief requested by the tribal governing body recog-
nized by the BIA. It is difficult to understand how subject mat-
ter jurisdiction can be found as to one party but not the other.
"Apodaca v. Silvas, 19 E3d 1015 (5th Cir. 1994) (appel-
lants were "removed from tribal membership rosteri of Ysleta
del Sur Pueblo); Ordinance 59 Association v. Babbitt, 970 E
Supp. 914 (D. Wyo. 1997) (43 applicants for membership in
Eastern Shoshone Tribe sought enforcement of a tribal court
order that they be enrolled).
1391997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5138 (N.D.N.Y).
sidents who challenged the tribal authorities, at least in
part, over development and operation of the tribe's gam-
ing enterprise.As in the Stockbridge-Munsee cases, the fac-
tionalism may predate the introduction of gaming.
2. Tribal Court Determinations
There are few reported cases of membership deter-
minations decided by tribal courts. Even fewer relate to
IGRA issues. Nevertheless, the tribal court cases provide
a glimpse of how membership issues related to IGRA
might be resolved.
The reported tribal court enrollment cases do not
reveal any explicit connection to gaming issues. One
case involves the Hoopa, a California tribe without a
class III gaming compact. In the late 1980's, a woman
petitioned for enrollment based upon her putative
father's tribal membership. Although the petition was
opposed by the deceased father's sister, the petitioner
was enrolled by the tribe. 42 An appeal by other family
members was dismissed by the tribal court.4 3 Another
144
case, also apparently involving disputed paternity,
comes from a gaming tribe, the Ho-Chunk, but makes no
reference to gaming considerations. 14 The petitioner,
supported by his father's sister and mother, obtained a
decision from the "Clan Leader Traditional Court" that he
was "4/4th Winnebago blood, born of the Winnebago fire
place."' The Ho-Chunk trial court confirmed the deci-
sion of the "Traditional Court Elders."147 These two cases
do not indicate any particular interest in limiting tribal
membership, at least in situations of disputed paternity.
140Baldy v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, 22 Indian Law






14White v. Ho-Cbunk Nation Enrollment Office, 24 Indian
Law Reporter 6031 (Ho-ChunkTr. Ct. 1996).
145Formerly known as the Winnebago.
'424 ILR at 6031.
1471d.
148The Colville are one of the few tribes in Washington that
have not entered into a Class II gaming compact with the
state.
14922 Indian Law Reporter 6127 (Colv.Tr. Ct. 1995) arfd 24
ILR 6163 (Colv. Ct.App. 1997).
15023 Indian Law Reporter 6143 (Colv.Tr. Ct. 1996).
"5'Hoffman 24 ILR at 6165 n. 5. Prior to this "one-fourth
Indian blood" was the prevailing threshold. Id. at 6164-65.
2Id. at 6165 citing a 1988 amendment to the Tribal
Constitution.
153See generally, Hoffman, 24 ILR at 6168-70; Hoffman, 22
ILR at 6130-33;Pouley, 23 ILR at 6145-6150.
'4Pouley, 23 IR at 6144; see also Hoffman 22 ILR at 6128-29.
55Hoffman 22 ILR 6129."It is not easy to establish entitle-
ment to a blood degree correction because the membership
The Colville Confederated Tribes 18 have developed a
more comprehensive approach to membership issues in
two recent cases Hoffman v. Colville Confederated
Tribe149 and Pouley v. Colville Confederated Tribe. 0 In
1959 the Colville Constitution was amended to require
that members have "one fourth (1/4) degree blood of the
tribes which constitute the Confederated Tribes."" The
blood quantum recorded on the official census rolls of
152
1937 are regarded as authoritative, although the blood
quantum of individuals on these rolls is inconsistent with
information in other records.' Apparently recognizing
this, tribal law waives sovereign immunity to allow mem-
bers to petition for "a correction of their blood
degrees. The petitioner must meet an "onerous bur-
den" of presenting clear and convincing evidence that
her"blood degree" has been miscalculated. I55
There is some indication that individuals may seek
membership in order to obtain material benefits that
come with tribal membership. In Hoffman, for instance,
a member listed on the tribal roll apparently sought an
increase in blood degree so that his children could obtain
settlement payments. In Pouley, however, several of the
plaintiffs had applications for tribal membership made on
their behalf over two decades prior to the litigation.
Moreover, the Hoffman court viewed the matter"as more
than a simple, mechanical blood degree correction.
Rather, this is an action to establish one's identity.
" 158
Among the frequently mentioned benefits of tribal
membership are certain economic advantages, including a
potential pro rata share of tribal property. 59 Congress implic-
itly seems to have shared this utilitarian view of tribal mem-
intended for it not to be easy.There is thus a strong tribal inter-
est in preserving the 1937 roll as a starting point for all mem-
bership matters, and accordingly a statutory presumption that
the blood degrees on the roll are correct." Hoffman, 24 ILR at
6168.
16Hoffman, 22 ILR 6127.The children, non-members, were
dismissed as plaintiffs for lack of standing.
157Pouley, 23 ILR 6145.
Hoffman, 22 ILR 6130.A study conducted on the neigh-
boring Spokane Tribe in the late 1960s found that self-identity
as whites of enrolled tribal members was correlated, to some
degree, with one's white ancestry among urban residents but
not among reservation residents. See Lynn White and Bruce
Chadwick, Urban Residence, Assimilation and Identity of the
Spokane Indians, In Native Americans Today: Sociological
Perspectives 239, 244-46 (Howard Bahr, Bruce Chadwick and
Robert Day, eds., 1972).
159See, Max Gluckman, Gossip and Scandal, 4 Current
Anthropology 307, 310 (1963); George Castile, The
Commodification of Indian Identity, 98 American Anthropologist
743 (1996). Gluckman and Castile note, however, some non-eco-
nomic benefits to tribal membership. Castile adds that "other,
largely non-economic, corporate benefits to official tribal status
... are probably more valuable in the long run to tribal peoples
... "Id. at 746.
bership in mandating the parameters for the distribution of
gaming revenues.While the plaintiffs did not prevail in either
the Pouley or Hoffman cases, there is no indication in these
carefully reasoned opinions that a tribal interest in limiting
the distribution of economic benefits was a decisive factor.
160 An examination of tribal membership controversies from
earlier times provides an historical perspective for weighing
the importance of economic considerations in the mainte-
nance of Indian identity. It also supplies a richer and deeper
understanding of how Congressional policies may affect trib-
al identity in unanticipated ways.
IV. TRIBAL PROPERTY, TRIBAL INTEGRITY AND
MEMBERSHIP: CASE STUDIES OF THE CHEROKEE,
PUEBLO AND UTE TRIBES
Dissolution and Alotment.- The Cherokee
Experience
Roffv.Burney was decided at a time when tribal mem-
bership was regarded as offering opportunities for eco-
nomic benefits because it would entitle the member to a161
portion of tribal assets. Roff was one of numerous cases
involving Congressional acts designed to dissolve the trib-
T6°Zhe Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of north-
western Montana, like the Colville Tribes, have a history of
extensive intermarriage. Ronald L. Trosper, Native American
Boundary Maintenance. The Flathead Indian Reservation,
Montana, 1860-1970, 3 Ethnicity 256 (1976). Trosper argues
that the tribes' definition of membership are "part of a defensive
strategy to protect tribal wealth." Id. at 257.These tribes, like the
Colville Tribes, also have a long history of concern with ances-
try and enrollment criteria. Id. Russell Thornton, The Cherokees:
A Population History 142-43 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1990) (citing Trosper's article) contrasts the restrictive
approach to tribal membership with that of the Cherokee dis-
cussed, infra, part IVA: "Whereas the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes attained tribal survival through development of
a new policy of exclusiveness, the Cherokees in Oklahoma have
more or less maintained a policy of inclusiveness."
161See generally, Cohen, supra note 7, at 130-134 (dis-
cussing the assimilative purposes of the General Allotment, Act
24 Stat. 388); Dew Wisdom, an Indian Territory agent, wrote in
1894 that Cherokee "prosperity would be enhanced greatly if
the land in this nation was sectionized, and each Indian felt
sure that in making an improvement of any kind would be his
in fee simple." Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs [RCIA] 1894 at 142 [published 1895].
162
James Mooney, Myths of the Cherokee, in Nineteenth
Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution 189798,pt. 1,168 (1900).
163The Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U.S. 288,298-99 (1886).
In 1785, the United States government and the Cherokee
nation signed the Treaty of Hopewell (7 Stat. 18; Charles
Kappler, LAWS AND TREATIES II: 8-11; Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office; 1904). By this agreement the
United States recognized the Cherokee as comprising a single
al governments of Indian Territory, including the Cherokee,
and to distribute the tribal assets to tribal members.
The Cherokee experience with federal dissolution
and allotment policies provides a framework for under-
standing the nexus among federal policies, tribal gover-
nance and membership, and ethnicity. The Cherokee
occupied a large portion the southeastern United States
prior to the removal of most to Indian Territory in the
1830's. For a brief time in the early 19th century, the
United States recognized two Cherokee polities - the
Western Cherokee (or Old Settlers), who had relocated
to the west prior to the 1830s, and those who
remained in the southeast until the removal. 163 After a164
period of bitter and sometimes violent conflict16 the
two groups formally reunited in Indian Territory.
However, through a series of federal acts passed
from the 1880's to the early 1900's the Cherokee Nation
of Indian Territory was dissolved. These acts were con-
sistent with the then prevailing federal allotment policy
that was designed to convert tribal communal property
into individually owned small plots of land.16 To effect
this policy, Congress created the Dawes Commission and
authorized it to prepare an official roll of Cherokees enti-
168
tied to a share of the tribe's communal assets.
polity. The Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U.S. at 295 (1886).
Between the 1780s and 1820s, the Cherokee economy was
transformed and lands were ceded. United States v. Old
Settlers, 148 U.S. 427 (1893). Federal policy stressed removal of
Indians from their homelands to areas west of the Mississippi
River. The Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U.S. at 300; See general-
ly, Cohen, supra note 7, at 78-92. In the first three decades of
the 19th century about a third of the Cherokee population
moved west. United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. at 430. In
1838 most Eastern Cherokee were removed to Indian Territory
where they settled among the "Old Settlers." Id.
Among the new-comers there were also bitter differences
between those that had promoted and those that had resisted
removal from the southeast. The Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U.S.
at 306. See generally Gerard Reed, Postremoval Factionalism in
the Cherokee Nation, In The Cherokee Indian Nation:ATroubled
History (Duane H. King, ed.) 148-163 (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1979); Duane Champagne, Social Order and
Political change: Constitutional Governments Among the
Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw and the Creek 178-182
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
165The Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U.S. at 303-307. In a 1846
treaty, the United States again recognized only a single Cherokee
polity. Id. at 306.A small portion of the Eastern Cherokee popu-
lation, somewhat over 1,000 people, escaped removal and set-
tled in a remote location in the Appalachian Mountains of North
Carolina. Mooney, supra note 164, at 167-68.The North Carolina
Cherokee are discussed at notes 185-197, infra.
66Report of the Commissioner to the Five Civilized Tribes
IN Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for
1906 [RCIA 1906] 589-95 (1907), summarizes this legislation.
t67See generally, Cohen, supra note 7, at 128-14 1.
IMRCIA, 1906, supra note 166, at 590-91.
Although the Dawes Commission was empowered169
to make decisions regarding Cherokee citizenship, it
generally followed Cherokee laws regarding citizenry.70
The final rolls show the Cherokee Nation encompassed
an ethnically diverse citizenry. Less than a quarter of the171
population was designated as "fullblood." Most172
Cherokee citizens were of mixed ancestry. Over ten
percent of the population was of predominately African173
ancestry, primarily former Cherokee slaves and their
descendants. There were also some "intermarried
whites"1' and Cherokee citizens "by adoption'"The last
category included people of Indian ancestry, notably
176
Delawares.
There were several thousand individuals whose claims
of Cherokee citizenship were denied. '77 Some of these
folks wished validation of their claims to Cherokee status
in order to receive a pro rata share of tribal property.178
Whether most invalidated claims were motivated by such
utilitarian interests rests upon inference rather than clarity
in the historical record. Even if instrumental interests or
economic "rationalism" was the basis of the "Cherokee
identity" in some marginal cases, the circumstances sur-
rounding Cherokee dissolution and the resistance of
Ketoowah society show many other individuals grounded
their Cherokee identity on other considerations.
There was tremendous opposition to the dissolution
of the Cherokee Nation among certain elements of the
"Id. 592-97.
7/d. at 622-26. Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193
U.S. 127 (1904) (adopted members of Delaware ancestry);
Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906) (status of
intermarrying whites determined with reference to changes in
Cherokee law); United States ex rel Lowe v. Fisher, 223 U.S. 95
(1912) (status of Cherokee freedmen); Cherokee Nation v.
Whitmire, 223 U.S. 108 (1912) (status of Cherokee freedmen).
171Morris L. Wardell, A Political History of the Cherokee
Nation 332-333 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938).
1Russell Thornton, The Cherokees:A Population History,
124-26 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) (over
three-fourths of all Cherokees in the 1910 census were of
mixed ancestry, primarily white and Cherokee).
17Wardell, supra note 171, at 333; Some of those denomi-
nated as "freedmen" were undoubtedly of mixed Cherokee and
African heritage. See Daniel E Littlefield, The Cherokee
Freedmen: From Emancipation To American Citizenship, 75-
78 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978) (intermarrying "blackswi
were not recognized as citizens).
74Id. See also United states ex rel Lowe v. Fisher, 223 U.S.
223 (1912).
175Wardell, supra note 171, at 333; The Cherokee
Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906).
'76Wardell, supra notel7l, at 333; Delaware Indians v.
Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127 (1904); see also; Cherokee
Nation v.Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196 (1894).
177RCIA 1906, supra note 166, at 626.
18RCIA 1896, supra note 166, at 155-57 (agent Wisdom's
report on persistence of rejected claimants).
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Cherokee population. The opposition was spearhead-
ed by a secret society, the Ketoowah, led by Redbird
Smith. Ho This group is almost universally identified with
the "fullblood" segment of the population."" Many
refused to cooperate with the Dawes Commission
which, therefore, had difficulty placing these people on
the rolls. ""The racial rhetoric of the times equated sup-
port of tribal communal land holding with high Indian
"blood quantum."The Keetoowah's explicit theme, how-
ever, was preservation of Cherokee sovereignty and cul-
183
ture. Rather than cooperate with the Dawes
Commission by placing their names on the final tribal
roll, many risked losing access to a pro rata share of the
tribal property. The irony is that many of those most
vehemently seeking to preserve tribal integrity refused
to be officially identified as tribal members. It is difficult
to reconcile this political stance with the utilitarian and
rational choice assumptions implicit in the work of the
Dawes Commission.
To compound irony, during the years that the
Cherokee Nation of Indian Territory was being dissolved,
the Cherokee in North Carolina were gradually accruing
elements of sovereignty and the status of a semi-inde-
pendent polity. These Cherokee, particularly those resid-
ing in a community at Qualla, 18 maintained an ambiva-
lent relationship with the state.'86 They were considered
a distinct community and incorporated under state
179RCIA 1906, supra note 166, at 594,623,625.
180Russell Thornton, Boundary Dissolution and
Revitalization Movements: The Case of the Nineteenth
Century Cherokees, Ethnohistory 40(3):359- (1993); Robert
Thomas, The Redbird Smith Movement, IN Symposium on
Cherokee and Iroquois Culture, Bureau of American Ethnology,
Bulletin 180 (1961) pages 161-66.
181Testifying through an interpreter before a Senate
Committee Redbird Smith stated that he had been sent by the
fullbloods. Statement of Redbird Smith In Report of the Select
Committee to investigate matters connected with Affairs in the
Indian Territory. Senate Report No. 5013, Part 1,59th Congress,
2d Session (1907), vol. 1, page 97.Asked if he were a fullblood
Indian, Smith responded,"I think I must be a full blood; I don't
know, but I think I am "Id.
1 82Id. at 97-100; RCIA 1906, supra note 166, at 623.
1
83Thomas, supra note 180; Thornton, supra notel80, at
373-74;Wardell, supra note 171, at 327-28.
'" Thomas, supra note 180, at 164.
185Having escaped the sabers of General Winfield Scott's
troops in the late 1830s, these Cherokee found refuge and,
through the agency of an interested white entrepreneur and
politician, obtained lands known as the Qualla Boundary.
Mooney, supra note 164, at 157-59. After the Civil War, they
sought a portion of the funds of the Cherokee Nation. Id. 172-
77. In 1886 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the North Carolina
Cherokee was not a tribe distinct from the Cherokee Nation of
Indian Territory. Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 US 288 (1886).
1
8
6United States v.Wright, 53 E2d 300,302-305 (4th Cir. 1931)
(subject to state law but not admitted to citizenship in the state).
! 87
law. The Bureau of Indian Affairs gradually began pro-
viding services for the Qualla population. In 1924 a
Congressional act placed the Qualla lands in trust for the
purpose of future allotment. Congress also authorized
a tribal membership roll and determined the degree of
Cherokee required, specifically rejecting "a clause in the
Band's corporate charter limiting membership to indi-
viduals with at least one-sixteenth Indian blood." 9°There
were over 12,000 applications for membership but the
final roll consisted of only 3,157."" Slightly over half the
enrollees were designated as possessing less than 50%
Cherokee ancestry.1 9 The trust lands had not been allot-
ted by the 1930's when the allotment process, and assim-
ilationist policies generally, were halted. 193
Currently a federally recognized tribe, the Eastern
Band Cherokee set their own criteria for tribal member-
ship. There has been contention over these criteria194
throughout the century. By 1986, nearly two-thirds of
tribal members were less than one-half Cherokee in
ancestry. 19'The tribal charter was amended in the 1980s
to allow any enrolled member to serve as principal
chief'96 and to allow "first-generation, non-enrolled
descendants of a tribal member to inherit that individ-
ual's possessory rights.
' 97
Cherokee history, both in Indian Territory and North
Carolina, shows shifts in membership (citizenship) crite-
ria. At times, changes have been a response to federal
policies or have been directly shaped by Congress.
Economic factors influence, but rarely seem to deter-
mine, citizenship criteria. Socio-political and cultural fac-
tors are at least equally important.The rhetoric of "race"
or "blood" persists, but these idioms tend to mask, rather
than clarify, a more fundamental consideration - an
emphasis on tribal sovereignty and communal control of
"Id. at 304; RCIA 189 1,supra note 166, at 680-81 (reprint-
ing the 1889 North Carolina Act of incorporation).
88Wright, 53 E2d at 304-306.
1d. at 305.
'"John R. Finger, Cherokee Americans: The Eastern Band
of Cherokees in the Twentieth Century, 47 (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1991).
191 Id. at 48.
'92Id. at 48-49; those "with less than one-sixteenth
Cherokee blood ... [were] denigrated as "White Indians." Id. at




1d. at 46 (1920s), 51 (1930), 124-125 (1940s), 146-47
(1960s); see also 25 CFR part 75 (Revision of the Membership
Roll of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, North Carolina).
These regulations were to govern revision of the rolls pursuant
to a 1957 CongressionalAct (71 Stat. 374). 25 CFR 75.2.
195
96Finger, supra note 190, at 172.
Id. at 173 (previously this officer had to have at least
one-half Cherokee blood).
"Id. at 174.
assets. This "cultural" focus, rather than individual eco-
nomic self-interest or degree of Cherokee ancestry,
occurs again and again in Cherokee history as the sine
qua non of Cherokee identity.
Moreover, Cherokee history reveals that tribal enti-
ties are not static. Portions of the Cherokee population
have separated from each other, resulting in the creation
of distinct political communities. Distinct tribal entitieswel198
have sometimes merged as well. This history also
reveals inconsistency in federal policy.The United States
government once denied recognition of any Cherokee
government but currently recognizes three Cherokee
polities199 each having elements of sovereignty and con-
trol over the qualifications of its members or citizens.
B. Dissidents and Cultural Norms: The Pueblo
Experience
The Martinez" case, unlike the Cherokee cases,
contains little explicit reference to the economic impor-
tance of tribal membership. This is significant. The
Puebloan peoples of New Mexico have maintained a dis-
tinctive cultural stance despite a history of sustained
contact with non-Indians that is lengthier than that of
any other group of Indians in the United States.Although
property presumably plays some role in tribal identity
among Puebloans, other considerations seem to be far
more salient.
Historically the Puebloans were an agricultural peo-
ple in a precarious environment subject to periodic
drought and other factors that probably set an upper
bound on population in any particular settlement.
Pueblo society is frequently described emphasizing on
conformity to group norms. Nonconformists and those
'See supra notes 162-165, (reunification of Old Settlers
with newly removed southeastern Cherokee).
99In addition to the Eastern Band Cherokee in North
Carolina, two Oklahoma Cherokee polities, Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma and United Keetoowah Band, are federally recog-
nized. 62 Fed Reg. 55270, 55271, 55274.
"See 436 U.S. 49 (1978), discussed, supra, part HA.
201Edward Dozier, The pueblo Indians of North America,
177 (1970) ("Because Pueblo society ... is so highly structured
and communal life is emphasized, individual freedom is not
always given the expression found in other societies"). See also
Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, 57-129 (Houghton Mifflin,
1959 [1934]); Esther Goldfrank, Socialization, Personality, and
the Structure of Pueblo Society, American Anthropologist
47:516-39 (1945). Jerrold Levy has suggested that in times of
drought, lower status Hopi families were ejected from villages.
Families with important religious and political offices
remained. Jerrold E. Levy, Orayvi Revisited: Social Stratification
in an "Egalitarian" Society 7982 (1992). In this fashion the basic
cultural pattern may be preserved.
who resist directives of village leaders, risk accusations
of witchcraft, including responsibility for droughts.' °2
Given the 'theocratic' nature of Puebloan society exter-
nal pressures to alter religious practices and the conver-
sion of tribal members to new religions both are viewed
as threats to preservation of Puebloan culture.0 3
In 1921, the BLA initiated a campaign to restrict
Puebloan ceremonies. The policy was designed to
"christianize" and "assimilate" - an explicit attempt to
alter the content of Puebloan culture. John Collier
helped organize Pueblo opposition to the BIA policy. As
one means of mobilizing non-Indian opposition to the
BIA policy, Collier framed the issue as one of "personal
liberty."205
By 1934 Collier was Indian Commissioner and was
seeking to strengthen tribal sovereignty. A controversy,
involving the "collective rights" of a tribal sovereign and
the "liberal" value of religious freedom, confronted
Collier. In the early 1930's several members of the
Herrera family at Zia Pueblo converted to a fundamen-
talist Christian sect (Holy Rollers).2°6They began prosely-
tizing at Zia and, for religious reasons, refused to partici-
pate in a number of communal activities. 2°7 Eventually,
the Zia council ordered that the Herreras' land be cut off
from irriation and that their livestock be removed from
Zia land. "8 One of the Herreras suspected that the coun-
2Edward Dozier, Hano: A Tewa Indian Community in
Arizona, 67-68 (NewYork: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966) pro-
vides a succinct description of the nature of witchcraft accusa-
tions in one Pueblo.At Zuni, only the crimes of witchcraft and
cowardice in battle carried the death penalty.Watson Smith and
John M. Roberts, Zuni Law:A Filed of Values, 38 (Papers of the
Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, vol
43, no. 1, 1953).The confession of a young man indicates that
differences in wealth and social status played a role in some
witchcraft cases: "Whenever any one had fine children .... or
any kind of animals, sheep or cattle, or anything by which he
prospers then our [witches] hearts ache. Therefore we kill
them" Id. at 40.
2;3Following attempts by Franciscan missionaries to sup-
press Pueblo religion in the 17th century, the Puebloans of the
Rio Grande united to expel the Spaniards from the region in
the "Pueblo Revolt" of 1680. Edward Dozier, Rio Grande
Pueblos, in Perspectives in American Indian Culture Change,
130-33 (Edward H. Spicer ed., 1961). Following the Spanish
.reconquest,' Puebloans continued to practice their religion
although they "hid much of the ceremony from those who
were not members of the tribe". Id. at 139-40,149-51,164-65.
2°4Lawrence C. Kelly, The Assault on Assimilation: John
Collier and the origins of Indian policy Reform, 303-314
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press; 1983) (dis-
cussing Burke's issuance of Circular No. 1665 and its supple-
ment and the subsequent controversy).20
5Id. at 340.
cil might order a'hunting accident' in lieu of the'old pun-
ishment' for witchcraft. Beginning in 1939, and backed
by the Indian Agent in Albuquerque, the Zia governmn
body took steps to expel the Herreras from the Pueblo.
In 1948 "the heretics living in Sia were given one last
chance to recant or accede to the pueblo's terms: some
capitulated, others agreed to leave the pueblo." 212
In this case the tribal sovereign, backed by the BIA,
took steps to 'revoke' the tribal membership of individu-
als whose views and actions had the "potential power for
disintegration of the closely 2 organized theocratic social
structure of the Pueblo .... " Thus the Herrera contro-
versy exemplifies adherence to fundamental cultural val-
ues and norms as paramount criterion for tribal mem-
bership. The Herreras, evicted from Zia, remained Zia in
ancestry and upbringing. Many relatives remained resi-
dent in the village.The fundamental question was one of
cultural values considered intrinsic to tribal identity.
C Terminating the Mixed-Blood Northern Utes
Beginning in the late 19th century, the Utes" ' of
Colorado and Utah sought compensation for loss of
215
lands. Some funds were received in 1911 and 1934,
contributing to strife between mixed-blood and full-
blood Northern Utes regarding the use of tribal assets.
2°6The Herrera controversy has been described by E
Adamson Hoebel, Keresan Pueblo Law, In Law in Culture and
society, 112-16 (Laura Nader, ed., Chicago: Aldine, 1969);
Florence Hawley, The Keresan Holy Rollers, Social Forces,
26:272-280 (1948); Leslie White,The Pueblo of Sia, New Mexico
67-78 (Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 184, 1962).
White's observation that "[m ]any of the converts have married
non-Sia," Id. at 71, primarily people of other tribes, is interesting
given that the Herrera controversy was brewing at the time the
nearby Pueblo of Santa Clara adopted it's per se rule on patri-
lineal descent.
207Hoebel, supra note 206, at 112-113.
208Id. at 113-114;White, supra note 206, at 72.
209Hawley, supra note 206, at 275.
"D Hoebel, supra note 206, at 113.211d. at 114.
2Id. at 113.
213Hawley, supra note 206, at 274. Presumably because the
vital link between religion and cultural preservation, Congress
did not include the first amendment provisions regarding the
establishment of religion when, in 1968, it placed new limita-
tions upon tribal sovereignty by passing the Indian Civil Rights
Act (ICRA; 25 USC 1301 et seq.). See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62-63.
214Several Ute tribes were involved in these claims includ-
ing the Northern Ute.21 oseph G.Jorgensen, The Sun Dance Religion: Power for
the Powerless 112 (1972).
In 1950 the Northern Utes were awarded $17.5 mil-
lion. 1 7 Most of these funds were used for tribal pro)ects
but there was also a $1,000 per capita distribution.
This award was received at a time when the domi-• 219
nant federal policy stressed termination. Many mixed-
bloods supported "individualism" and diminished tribal
control. 20 Factionalism was exacerbated and the full-
bloods sought to have mixed-bloods expelled from the
221
tribe. The BIA encouraged "this action as the first step
in terminating both fullbloods and mixed-bloods from
federal obligations." 
2
Designated as the "Affiliated Ute Citizens," the 490
mixed-bloods dissociated from the Northern Ute tribe in
1954 22 and received 27% of the claims award plus a sec-224
tion of the reservation. They anticipated improved
social and economic conditions by disassociating from• 225
the tribe and termination. Congress defined the "blood
quantum" level necessary for membership in the non-ter-
minated group:
"Fullblood" means a member of the tribe who pos-
sesses onehalf degree of Ute Indian blood and a total of
Indian blood in excess of onehalf, excepting those who
2211
become mixedbloods by choice ....
In the 1950's Northern Ute tribal members were
I26/d. at 112-113, 147, 263; Gottfried Lang, Economic
Development and Self-Determination: The Northern Ute Case.
20 Human Organization 164, 165 (1961).The terms Full Blood
and Mixed Blood were used by the Utes. Robert L. Bennett,
Building Indian Economies with Land Settlement Funds, 20
Human Organization 159, 160 n. 2 (1961). The terms were
apparently not precisely defined, however. Bennett includes
any one "having ancestry other than Ute" as a mixed blood. Id.
Jorgensen, supra note 215, at 152, counts as fullbloods those
with "over 50 percent Ute blood.iThe 1954 statutory definition
is found at note 226, infra.
217Bennett, supra note 216, at 159.
Id. at 159-60 (noting certain restrictions placed on per
capita distributions; Lang, supra note 216, at 167-68;Jorgensen,
supra note 215, at 113.
C2Cohen, supra note 7, at 152-180.
22Lang, supra note216, at 168.
2212Jorgensen, supra note215, at 151-52.
Id. at 151.
223Act of Aug. 27, 1954, Pub. L. No. 670, 68 Stat. 868 (codi-
fied as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 677).
224
Jorgensen, supra note 215, at 152
221Id. "The 1954 Act divided the Ute Tribe ... into two
groups, the mixedbloods and the fullbloods, and terminated
only one of those groups, the mixedbloods. The mixedbloods
were given their share of the tribal assets and their tribal iden-
tity was terminated. This termination was effective on August
24, 1961, when the Secretary of the Interior issued a proclama-
tion removing restrictions on mixedblood property and termi-
nating federal recognition of the mixedbloods as an Indian
tribe. The fullbloods, however, were not terminated as a tribe.
"almost wholly dependent upon unearned income227
derived from land claims judgments. The distributions
were reduced in the 1960's and in 1966 "an annual divi-
dend" was $150. 2's By 1984 the dividend payment had
229risen to $4,800 per capita per year.
Tribal membership issues have persisted despite the
termination of the Affiliated Ute Citizen "mixed-bloods."
In 1958 the Northern Ute Tribe, by ordinance, increased
to 5/8ths the proportion of Ute ancestry necessary for
tribal enrollment. The tribal constitution, however, pro-
vided that tribal members included all children born to
any member of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation who is a resident of the Reservation
at the time of the birth of such children.231
In the 1970s, children of enrolled tribal members chal-
232
lenged the blood quantum threshold in 1958 ordinance.
The tribal court held that the Tribal Constitutional provi-
sion controlled over the ordinance and ordered the chil-
dren be enrolled. 23 Responding to the tribal court deci-
sion, the tribe enacted a resolution in 1982 declaring the
blood quantum level in the 1954 federal act controlled
over the 1958 tribal ordinance and asked the BIA to
approve enrollment of the children." The BIA refused.
The federal decision was overturned in Chapoose v.
Congress intended that the fullbloods continue their tribal
identity, and that the federal government continue to fulfill its
trust responsibilities toward the fullbloods." Chapoose v. Clark,
607 ESupp 1027, 1029 (C.D. Utah 1985), af'd, 831 E2d 931
(10th Cir. 1987).
22625 U.S.C. § 677a(b) quoted in Chapoose, 607 F Supp. at
1029.
2Jorgensen, supra note 215, at 160. The total per capita
distributions between 1951 and 1959 came to somewhat over
$11,000 per member.22
8Id. at 161.
229Donald G. Callaway, Joel C.Janetski and Omer C. Stewart,
Ute, IN Handbok of North American Indians, vol 11: GREAT
BASIN 358 (Warren d'Azevedo, ed., Smithsonian Institution,
1986).2 3Chapoose, 607 ESupp. at 1031.23 1Constitution and Bylaws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, art.II, § l(b) quoted in
Chapoose, 607 ESupp. at 1036.
232Chapoose, 831 F2d at 933. By 1980 there were 1,000
individuals with 50% or less Ute ancestry who were children of
enrolled tribal members. CallawayJanetski, and Stewart, supra
note 229, at 358. Joseph Jorgensen, Sovereignty and the
Structure of Dependency at Northern Ute, 10(2) American
Indian Culture and Research Journal, 75, 84, 88-89 (1986), pro-
vides an overview of the enrollment issue. He notes that the
Northern Ute Tribe expresses "fears" over both the dilution of
full blood "culture" and "the drain of resources." Id. at 88.233Chapoose, 831 E2d at 933.
2341d.
235Chapoose, 607 ESupp. at 1032.
Clark.3 The district court found that "Congress intended
that the bloodquantum requirements ... be used only at the
time of division, to separate the fullbloods and mixed-
bloods so that the mixedbloods could be terminated."
The Northern Ute Tribe's right to determine its own mem-
bership was unaffected. 2* "The only change was that the
mixedbloods were no longer tribal members for the pur-
poses of sharing in trust fund distributions."
2 39
Property interests are implicated in the examples pre-
sented here but so are interests in less tangible assets -
tribal values and community self-government. While tribes
may adopt membership rules stressing a particular line of
descent or a threshold proportion of ancestry, the
Cherokee, Pueblo and Ute experiences indicate that the
central concern is generally the preservation of values con-
ceived of as essential to cultural distinctiveness and auton-
omy. It is of paramount importance for tribal members to
maintain allegiance to the tribe's sphere of sovereignty and
a sense of cultural values. The advisability and conse-
quences of specific per se membership criteria based on
ancestry generally (or lineal descent, specifically) may be
debated but tribes, by setting membership rules, clearly
channel cultural content in certain ways and not others.
CONCLUSION
Some writers claim that tribes adopting gamin
under IGRA have altered membership criteria.
26607 ESupp 1027, 1029 (C.D. Utah 1985), affid sub nom
Chapoose v. Hodel, 831 E2d 931 (10th Cir. 1987).
237Chapoose, 607 ESupp. at 1034.
8Id.23 9Chapoose, 607 ESupp. at 1034.The court reasoned that
the terminated mixedbloods received assets they could bestow
upon their children. The full bloods, however, remained tribal
members whose property is held in trust by the federal gov-
ernment. According to the court, "[ti he only thing of value a
fuflblood tribal member can pass on to his children is the right
to become a tribal member." Chapoose, 607 ESupp. at 1036.
240K.R.L. Rand and S.A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA
Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty,
and Identity, Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 381 (1997); Mark Neath,
American Indian Gaming Enterprises and Tribal Membership:
Race, Exclusivity, and a Perilous Future, 2 U Chicago Law School
Roundtable 689 (1995).
241
Rand and Light, supra note 240, at 424.
24Id. at 434.
243Several"empirical examples" of membership controversy
cited by commentators - the Pequot (Naomi Mezey, Note, The
Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through
Indian Gaming, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 724-728 (1996); Joseph
Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 Drake L. Rev. 501,511-512; Rand
and Light, supra note 240, at 422-23; Neath, supra note 241, at
695), Santee Sioux tribes (Kelly at 543; Rand and Light at 419-23,
Neath at 695-96) and New York Iroquois (Mezey at 729, Rand
Specifically, Rand and Light assert that concern over dis-
tribution of gaming revenues "reinforces a narrow and
,241exclusive view of tribal membership." They add, based
on several "empirical examples," that gaming tribes gen-
erally seem to elect to alter their membership criteria. In
using their sovereign powers to make those changes,
tribes thus alter their numerical composition, along with
what it means to be a tribal member. In changing tribal
membership, tribes also alter individuals' conceptions of
the self, as well as of the collective; that is, of individual
and tribal identity. Because this entire process is initiated
by the incentives created by IGRA's gaming revenue pro-
visions, IGRA's impact extends beyond membership cri-
242
teria to tribal identity.
It is clear that federal policy has long influenced
both the definition of tribes and individual identity.
Federal policy has helped shape the criteria incorporat-
ed into tribal definitions of membership. What is not
clear from the limited available "empirical examples" is
how gaming is being integrated into this process. The
historical examples presented in part II caution against
simple rational choice utilitarian assumptions. The few
recent cases that involve membership disputes also pre-
sent a less than clear picture.
Most tribal members self-identify primarily as a
member of the tribe in which they are enrolled. They
may share interests with those of other tribes, especially
245
in certain contexts (urban centers, powwows, religious
bodies, rodeos), but they often view themselves and their
and Light at 431) - have a far more ambiguous relationship to
gaming than the commentators suggest. For example, Rand and
Light, at 423, and Neath, at 695, view the Mdewakanton Santee
Sioux membership controversy at Shakopee involving primarily
a minimum "blood quantum" requirement for membership. In
fact, some of the plaintiffs were not enrolled tribal member.The
crux of the dispute seems related more to contesting member-
ship decisions made by tribal officials seeking to enroll sup-
porters rather than a wish to limit distribution of gaming rev-
enues (see text and notes at 123-127, supra). Moreover, Neath,
at 695, and Rand and Light, at 423, also suggest that the reason
the Eastern Band Cherokee increased blood quantum require-
ments (from 1/32 to 1/16) was related to gaming. In fact the
controversy over ancestry has persisted throughout the centu-
ry. See text and notes 189-195, supra.
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At a recent American Indian Movement Conference, a
Mescalero speaker told the story of a young boy who asked
him and a friend if they were "real" Indians. "No," replied the
friend, "I'm a Hopi. Real Indians live in India." Jennifer
Lugowski, American Indians hold Fresno Forum, The Fresno
Bee, Nov. 23, 1997, B-3.
'5See, Robert K. Thomas, Pan-Indianism, The Emergent
Native Americans 739 (Deward E. Walker, ed., Boston: Little,
Brown, 1972); Henderson, supra note 71, at 243.
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See generally, Joan Weibel-Orlando, Indian Country, L.A.
Maintaining Ethnic Community in Complex Society,
(University of Illinois Press, 1991).
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tribes as quite distinctive. "Indian" identity (as distinct
from, say, Navajo identity) is simply a box checked on a
census form or for some other bureaucratic purpose. It
often lacks personal relevance.
However, many non-Indian, and some Indian, people
maintain decidedly stereotyped views of what consti-
tutes Indian identity. Phillip Deloria observed that
because the "United States wants to preserve a romantic
ideal of the Indian way life"147 federal policy would likely
stress termination if Indians were "no longer poor or
viewed by the majority as being culturally distinct. In
a similar vein, Rosen comments that "[als westerners
think about indigenous peoples, they may, with the best
of intentions, tend to freeze such groups at a particular
moment in time or to create a climate in which certain
,natural'processes will not be disrupted by outside influ-
ences." Rosen adds that this romantic imagery has been
250
used by non-Indian opponents of Indian gaming.
The romanticism critiqued by Deloria and Rosen,
leads to the conclusion that the success of tribal opera-
tions under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act will motivate
individuals to claim Indian identity and seek tribal mem-
bership. 25' The utilitarian response of tribes may be, some
argue, to develop more restrictive membership crite-252
ria. Given the paucity of empirical research on this
issue, this paper has addressed some of the conceptual
aspects of the question by examining some legal contro-
versies involving tribal membership. The implication is
often that individual self-interest in expanding economic
benefits confronts tribal interests limiting benefits. But
gaming is rarely an unalloyed underlying 'cause' of mem-
bership controversies. It is essential to continue to exam-
ine the specific history of the numerous tribal contro-
versies over membership before concluding that dis-
247Philip S. Deloria, The Era of Indian Self-Determination.
An Overview, in Indian Self-Rule, 191 (Kenneth R. Philip ed.,
1986).
Id. at 193. Deloria added that the Indian activism cap-
tured the national imagination in the 1960s and 1970s but
"Indians did not discover they were Indians in the early 1970s.
We were not reborn; we were simply noticed." Id. at 204.
249 Rosen, supra note 30, at 252.
Id. (chiding Donald Trump for disparaging Indians run-
ning casinos for not looking like Indians). See also Rand and
light, supra note 240, at 424 (suggesting that tribes may alter
membership criteria in response criticism from Trump and oth-
ers); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Pursuing Tribal Economic
Development at The Bingo Palace, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 97, 110-111
(1997) (hypothesizing that Indian gaming "will undermine sov-
ereignty if it negates the view of tribes as poor and culturally
distinct"); James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, In The
putes over the distribution of gaming proceeds involve
simply or primarily a rational choice utilitarian calculus.
The troubling questions of gaming and perceived
intratribal inequities have led federal courts to suggest
alternative fora for individual Indian plaintiffs. For exam-
ple, the Davids court suggested that, in addition to tribal
court, the dissident plaintiffs could seek relief from the
National Indian Gaming Commission(NIGC),"' via the
Tribal-State compact, 254 or Congress. 255 The suggestion of
alternatives seems to indicate that the federal courts are
somewhat uneasy about the substantive results flowing
from the current jurisdictional jurisprudence.25
The suggestion that a state, through a compact,
would play a role in tribal political controversies, mem-
bership questions or the distribution of gaming revenues
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should bring a chill to tribal governments. This is so
because, today as in the past, states are often the "dead-.258
liest enemies" of tribal interests. It is difficult to know
what a state interest in tribal membership or governance
would be or how that might be manifested in a provision
of a compact.
Likewise, the NIGC interest in enrollment and other
membership issues is remote.This is especially so once a
distribution plan has been approved. Moreover, there is
no indication that NIGC has ever intervened in a case
involving issues of membership or factional strife.
Thus, the only suggested alternatives remaining are
tribal courts and Congress. Although many in Congress
have an interest in Indian gaming, the membership con-
troversies do not appear to be a central concern. Such
controversies, however, could be used as justifications
for more extensive changes to IGRA that would almost
certainly further curtail this sphere of tribal sovereignty.
Predicament of Culture (1988).
251See, Clifford, Id, at 284; Castile, supra note 159.
252Neath, supra note 240; Rand and Light, supra note 240.25
3Davids v. Coyhis, 869 E Supp. at 1412 n.13 (noting that
the NIGC has "the power to enforce IGRA's provisions and trib-
al ordinances through civil fines ... and ... closures of gaming
operations").
2"Id. (noting that the state may initiate an IGRA action to
enjoin class III gaming conducted in violation of the compact).
2"Id.; Montgomery, 905 E Supp. at 747, citing Davids, also
suggests that plaintiffs could bring alleged violations of tribal
gaming ordinances to attention of the NIGC or the state.25
See especially the discussion of Poodry, supra notes 91-
98.
257It is possible that courts suggest such recourse as a
veiled threat to tribal sovereignty.
2 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,384 (1886).
